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Background
The full Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) document was released one month after 
the announcement of its conclusion on October 5, 2015. The published text confirmed some 
fears1 but also brought relief as the details of what had been negotiated by twelve very diverse 
countries on the Pacific Rim became known.2 The text has being analyzed by legislative bod-
ies, their constituencies, stakeholders and civil society organizations to assess the conveni-
ence of joining the partnership and to address possible challenges in its implementation, 
including recent announcement by President-elect Donald Trump that the US would with-
draw from the TPP. Since the text can no longer be modified, the only option at this point is 
whether or not to join. Nevertheless, such a decision is difficult because, as to be expected, 
parts of the agreement are favorable while others are not. The TPP has been labeled as one of 
the most relevant contemporary trade mechanisms, not only because of the economic 
1 See Public Citizen website: http://www.citizen.org/TPP. Accessed April 14. 2016.
2 The signatory countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, United States, 
Singapore and Vietnam.
Abstract 
The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement was signed on February 4, 2016. The pub-
lished text confirmed some fears but also brought relief as the details of what had 
been negotiated became publicly known. This paper attempts to contribute to the 
discussion with a critical view of the Agreement, although not necessarily in equiva-
lence to US President-elect Donald Trump negative stand, but one of a developing 
country. The main argument holds that joining the TPP, or any other agreement alike, 
is not advisable unless Mexican industries are in a condition to compete. The line of 
reasoning is double-faceted: First, gains from the alleged diversification are insignifi-
cant, so handing over policy autonomy for development in exchange for access to 
negligible markets is not beneficial; second, its strong intellectual property rules would 
further hinder the policy space of the government for designing and implementing 
domestic science, technology and innovation programs. This would place Mexico at 
a disadvantage with regard to its prospects for a higher position in global production 
and value chains, not to mention develop full production chains led by national firms. 
As it is presently formulated, the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement would consoli-
date a structure of dependence and income inequality, two problems which Mexico is 
striving to overcome.
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weight of some of its members, but also because it addresses a sweeping range of issues 
including trade liberalization, an ambitious coverage of products and services, and rules gov-
erning non-trade-related matters such as investment and intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
(Barfield 2011). It has also stirred controversy over the limited and biased scope of the 
domestic economic policy options it allows participants and because it would set a new insti-
tutional framework for interaction between national governments and transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs)—one that is clearly slanted for the latter (Kolsky Lewis 2011; Rochon 2013).3
This article contributes to the TPP debate with a critical stance on its implications for Mexi-
can economic diversification goals and on the likely consequences of its IPR chapter. The anal-
ysis here contests its alleged long-term benefits for the public interest and wellbeing. I engage 
in the debate with the intention of showing the marginal impact that trade agreements have 
historically exerted on diversification, and to challenge the convenience for adopting strong 
IPR regimes in developing countries. My critique of the TPP dovetails with the argument that 
bringing economic benefits to the general public and the opportunity for Mexican firms—not 
only TNCs in Mexico—to engage in top tier, high-tech and high-value activities within global 
production chains, or develop full production chains domestically does require implementing 
a targeted developmental economic policy before joining. Upgrading the technological status 
of the Mexican industrial base poses a domestic challenge, and strict IPR regimes—especially 
with regard to patent regulations—are likely to hinder rather than stimulate local develop-
ment, as occurred with the pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s.4
I question the benefits of joining the TPP on the following grounds: First, previous 
experiences with trade agreements and the current structure of trade relations clearly 
demonstrate that the possibilities of economic diversification are insignificant. Hand-
ing over policy autonomy in many other crucial areas (such as foreign investment reg-
ulations and support to technology development) in exchange for access to negligible 
markets is an ill-advised bargain (Shadlen 2005). Second, the TPP rules on IPRs—even 
stricter than those of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—limit the policy space of 
governments for pursuing development goals, inter alia, cultivating the technological 
capabilities of the national economy and enhancing knowledge-based skills and innova-
tion. Should the TPP be ratified, the prospects for achieving a stronger Mexican indus-
try in global production/value chains and for nurturing infant industry are remote. As a 
consequence, the TPP would consolidate a structure that promotes instead of eliminat-
ing dependency and income inequality as benefits are concentrated in TNCs.
Methods
It can be safely concluded that the TPP would hardly contribute to the two avowed pol-
icy objectives of diversifying economic relations and improving the knowledge govern-
ance system in the service of national development goals. With this in mind, I structured 
3 From the Public Citizen website, see “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Empowering Corporations to Attack Nations” 
(http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=5411). Accessed April 14, 2016.
4 As a condition to negotiate the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico agreed to comply with the rules of 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1991, while such regime was still under negotiation—that 
is, not immediately before the TRIPs came into effect in 1995, but much earlier than the date stipulated for developing countries 
(2006)—unilaterally overlooking most of the flexibilities provided. Moreover, Mexico renounced to its former IPR regime and 
retroactively recognized pharmaceutical and other patents, which according to Mexican law were not patentable. As a result, 
Mexican pharmaceutical firms were driven to extinction or forced down the value chain to become producers of generics and 
incremental innovators, thereby its diminishing R&D and innovation capabilities (Aboites and Soria 2008).
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this research with a twofold objective: to evaluate progress made by Mexico in de-con-
centrating its economic relations by opening new markets through formal agreements, 
and to consider the impact of stronger IPR protection on achieving a more autonomous 
path to economic development. I approached these aspects of the TPP by formulating 
two research questions. First, in relation to the pro-TPP stance adopted by the Mexican 
government on the assumption that it provides vast opportunities to enter new mar-
kets in Asia, I ask: Based on Mexico’s experience with bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements, is it realistic to expect economic diversification as a consequence of the 
TPP? If the answer to this question is no, we would then ask: Are institutional changes 
to accommodate the TPP justifiable? Second: How would the TPP chapter on IPR affect 
the nation’s ability to design and implement programs for developing domestic science, 
technology and innovation capabilities? Evidence on both issues was obtained through 
a simple data search regarding the trade relations that Mexico has sustained with 
TPP members as export markets. I focused on the relative de-concentration achieved 
by Mexico vis-à-vis the United States (US) and on the export diversification potential 
claimed by the Mexican government. Other aspects of trade diversification such as for-
eign direct investment (FDI) were also taken into account. With regard to IPR impact 
specifically, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the ongoing debate on the implications 
of strong IPR regulations for industrial policy and economic development. I drew the 
data primarily from a literature search of secondary sources and from direct references 
to the TPP text.
The limited scope of this article does not allow for covering the totality of TPP chap-
ters. Therefore I centered the analysis on Chapter  18 regarding Intellectual Property, 
specifically on its patent-related Sections F and G and their subsections. The decision 
was prompted by evidence suggesting that strong IPR regulations5 such as those pro-
posed by the TPP not only stifle innovation, but actually limit the production and accu-
mulation of new knowledge. Evidence relates primarily to the global IPR regime 
launched in the 1980s and embodied in the WTO-TRIPS, free trade agreements and 
bilateral investment agreements. As a result, the domestic industries of developing 
countries are left to pursue only incremental and low-value innovation (Aboites et  al. 
2011; Aboites and Soria 2008). Moreover, strong IPR regulations render the use and 
transfer of technology more expensive for developing countries, encourage strategic pat-
enting abuse on the part of large firms (Ernst 2015b), and force signatory members to 
adhere to other agreements that may also prove detrimental to local producers seeking 
to develop their technological capacities.6 Open access and use of technology is deemed 
a fundamental condition for establishing higher-value domestic firms capable of either 
generating economic spillovers or penetrating current global production chains in the 
5 Strong intellectual property regimes are those that protect owners and producers of knowledge and inventions by 
excluding others from the exploitation of such assets, while weak regimes are those that encourage the widespread use 
of knowledge-assets, resulting from research and development investments undertaken by firms and individuals (Ordo-
ver 1991: 43).
6 For instance, according to TPP’s Article 18.7: International Agreement members are obliged to eventually join, among 
others, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, as amended September 28, 1979; the Paris Convention, as revised in Stock-
holm, July 14, 1967; the Budapest Treaty, as amended on September 26, 1980, which requires that all parties recognize 
microorganisms deposited as a part of the patent procedure, regardless of where the depository authority is located; 
the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants or UPOV, as revised at Geneva, March 19, 1991, 
which protects new varieties of plants as intellectual property rights, and of course, accept the TRIPs Agreement and its 
respective amendments.
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higher tiers. International agreements which compromise access to technology should 
not be the price of assuring the long-term prospects of economic development and well-
being of countries in the South (Olwan 2013). Such concessions constitute the underly-
ing argument of the present article. While strong IPR regimes may be adequate for 
knowledge governance among advanced techno-dependent economies, more flexible 
protection is required to stimulate knowledge diffusion and to support more effective 
national science and technology (S&T) policies in less advanced countries.
Three caveats are in order: First, I acknowledge that even if patent rules are weak and 
access to knowledge is open, no significant and economically useful knowledge and 
innovation is achievable without high educational standards and appropriate S&T poli-
cies (including financial support). Having said this, however, it is clear that strong IPR 
regulations make it difficult for firms in developing countries to take risks and invest in 
R&D, even if public policies “encourage” them to do so. Second, Section J on Internet 
Service Providers is controversial with regard not only to human rights and criminaliza-
tion in the use of the Internet, but also to its potential impact on economic development. 
Nonetheless, its discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Third, other sections of 
Chapter 18 such as Trademarks (C), Country Names (D), Geographic Indicators (E) and 
Copyrights (H) are considered important and to some extent favorable for the public 
interest; I therefore do not take a strong stance on these regulatory measures.
The road to TPP: How did we get here?
As is well known, the TPP started as a somewhat more modest 10-year integration pro-
ject among several small countries (Chile, Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore) on three 
continents with insignificant trade relations. The first agreement was signed in 2005 and 
took effect in May 2006.
The agreement maintained a low profile until 2008, when the US announced its inter-
est in joining; shortly thereafter, Australia, Peru, Vietnam and Malaysia followed suit. In 
2009, Barack Obama committed to participating in the negotiation process, thereby 
placing the TPP on the region’s radar (Barfield and Levy 2009). Since then, Washington 
has dictated the TPP agenda and has declared that it will set the “goal of shaping a 
regional agreement that will have broad-based membership and the high standards wor-
thy of a twenty first century trade agreement.”7 This triggered an interregional move-
ment which would have been unlikely to occur otherwise. Not surprisingly, given the 
complexity and scope of the TPP goals, negotiations were lengthy and held mostly in 
secret, with frequently missed deadlines (Rochon 2013). In June 2015, Obama was 
granted Trade Promotion Authority to speed up the negotiations and provide some 
assurance of a commitment from the US. Until then, the TPP was relatively unknown in 
Mexico and passed almost unnoticed by national media.
By the time TPP negotiations kicked off, most economies were already comparatively 
open. Many had trade agreements in place and enjoyed favorable access to the US mar-
ket. Therefore, trade itself appeared to be the least relevant issue as opposed to the strin-
gent non-trade related issues.
7 “U.S. engagement with the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Action to date,” USTR November 14, 2009. https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/tpp-statements-and-actions-date. Accessed April 7, 
2016.
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The TPP comprises 29 chapters, some of which deal with controversial and sensitive 
matters including competition rules for state enterprises and a mechanism for settling 
investor-state disputes (ISDS).8 It also contains provisions on IPRs, regulatory coherence, 
labor and environmental regulation, rules of origin, public sector procurement, e-com-
merce services and the Internet, financial services, telecommunications, and even account-
ing, transparency and corruption. It establishes rules for trade and investment relations, as 
well as for domestic public policy choices. Generally, FTAs affect public policies as do any 
formal agreements requiring parties to adjust their policies in order to reap the perceived 
gains from the new conditions. From this view, therefore, FTAs are meant to change 
domestic policies as they become common rules for reducing transaction costs. Given the 
wide scope of its items and areas of concern, the TPP imposes a standard of rules that 
obliges the parties to choose from a very limited set of options in areas well beyond trade 
and investment, regardless of their own policy preferences and development goals. Not-
withstanding the time frame negotiated by each party for adjusting practices and institu-
tions, the TPP ultimately aims to establish one criterion of wellbeing, freedom and 
development, as well as a fixed role for participants in the global value chains, without 
either consideration for their domestic needs and beliefs or an understanding of what is 
best for their local communities. This has clear political economy implications for the 
development of its members. They need to seriously consider two fundamental issues: 
how would the new rules affect their sovereignty and policy space (DiCaprio 2010; DiCap-
rio and Gallagher 2006; Gallagher 2007)9 as well as their opportunities for upgrading their 
position in the regional and global value/production chains versus locking into the low-
value locus? Many fear that the changes would lead to the second scenario.
While the TPP contemplates preferential access for member countries, the majority of 
chapters contain regulations that protect the activities and interests of TNCs (Rochon 
2013). That is not necessarily an evil thing in itself were it not coupled with disregard 
for development and social policies directed at making trade and investment fairer. The 
establishment of rules that level the playing field among actors with uneven levels of 
development does not seem right. Expecting transnational companies to share technol-
ogy and favor wealth distribution measures is historically unfounded, unless mediated 
by development-driven intervention. Therefore, one of the most severe criticisms of 
the Agreement concerns its most probable outcome: It appears designed to predomi-
nantly benefit large corporations (instead of serving developing economies) by imposing 
restrictions that render infant industry and domestic technological progress difficult if 
not impossible. In other words, the TPP is not designed to facilitate trade, reduce inter-
national monopolies or limit the power of TNCs; it is steered towards defending the 
interests of big corporations and institutionally underpinning their control over domes-
tic development options (Stiglitz and Hersh 2015). More emphatically than other signa-
tories, the US government has insisted on rules of this nature in the WTO and bilateral 
trade agreements it has negotiated.
8 The ISDS is the international system whereby transnational companies can sue the governments of countries in which 
they invest for affecting their business interests, expectations, or for violating their property rights. It grants an investor 
the right to use dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign government by using ad hoc extrajudicial tribunals that 
are authorized to order compensation.
9 Both Gallagher and DiCaprio’s papers refer to the WTO negotiations debate, which is similar to the discussions on TPP.
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For several decades, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its heir, 
the WTO, have provided the multilateral negotiation and mediation mechanisms for 
trade (largely concerning import tariffs and market access). This has worked fairly well, 
given the characteristics of international production and capital mobility of the post-
war era, distinguished by more centrally organized production chains and somewhat 
restrictive financial flows. However the evolution of the global productive and finan-
cial systems has brought new challenges and issues, such as IPR protection, which have 
indirectly affected the trade of goods and services. The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) 
attempted to tackle some of the emerging issues on the international trade agenda, but 
soon faced resistance leading to stalemate. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, created in 1989, resuscitated multilateral negotiations, and a Free Trade 
Agreement kicked off in 1992 as an outgrowth of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Shortly thereafter, in 1994, Canada, Mexico and the US launched an 
economic integration project culminating in the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
Nevertheless, negotiations on new rules for international trade through multilateral 
mechanisms are stalled again. As occurred in the Uruguay Round, the current Doha 
Round is stagnant. Many countries are thus opting to move forward and establish their 
own regional or bilateral rules, with some members unwilling to add new partners (Bald-
win et al. 2013; Drysdale 2013). The advent of mechanisms such as the TPP and its rival, 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), is an indication that, among 
other things, the timeworn rules of the international trade system have been unable to 
adapt to the growing importance of emerging economies (Aggarwal 2016). Instead, they 
mainly serve to accommodate the interests of large companies and new forms of inter-
national production such as business networks and modularization. Paradoxically, one 
of the most significant problems facing the TPP is the fact that the rules it proposes are 
precisely the ones that triggered the most resistance within the WTO, leaving the Doha 
Round at an impasse (Haunss 2013).
Throughout the last three or four decades, along with the institutional development of the 
postwar international trade regime, the Asia Pacific region has developed a regionalization 
process at the margins of the WTO. As part of this process, US exports have been gradually 
excluded from the Asian market. This is attributable not only to the intra-regional pacts ini-
tiating in the 1990s and proliferating in the 2000s (Bergsten and Schott 2010), but also to the 
Japanese, Korean, and Chinese business networks taking over the South East Asian econo-
mies. The exclusion of the US has been driven by Chinese eagerness to endorse a primarily 
Asian commercial and institutional structure (Bergsten 2007). Anxious to stay onboard, the 
US has sought to redefine its position in the Asian political economy alongside its long-
established role in the security realm (Limaye 2011; Solis 2011).
From the US perspective, the growing importance of Asia and the Pacific in the world 
economy means that the TPP could evolve into the long-desired Asia Pacific Free Trade 
Agreement yet serve as a precursor to a new set of regional and global rules with the US 
retaining a central role (Petri et al. 2011; Kolsky Lewis 2011). However, such a system 
faced great opposition in the US; its controversial provisions actually became one of the 
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central issues in during 2016 presidential elections.10 Two weeks after electoral results 
were confirmed, the President-elect Donald Trump stated that in the first 100 days of his 
administration, he would “issue a notification of intent to withdraw from the Trans 
Pacific Partnership” and “negotiate fair bilateral trade deals”.11 The Agreement is also 
under attack by civil society in other signatory countries12 and, significantly, by the 
RCEP, which has positioned itself as an alternative integration process, especially after 
Trump’s statement.13 In fact, the latter has excluded the US from the rule-making pro-
cess, and has adopted ASEAN as the central actor, although it is common knowledge 
that the partnership gravitates around China.14
Clearly, the TPP and the RCEP are tokens of the economic and political rivalry 
between the US and China, with both powers competing to establish the rules of the 
game for the new regional order. In this geopolitical context, the TPP can be seen as a 
manifestation of US economic diplomacy determined to form an institutional siege to 
contain China in the international system (Sakai 2011; de María y Campos 2016); the 
conspicuous absence of China is one of the most controversial characteristics of the TPP 
(Armstrong 2011).15 China has its own view of development and has played with the 
international trade and investment rules in a way that many observers qualify as preda-
tory but conveniently serves its development purposes. Even though China is part of the 
WTO and thus constrained by its rules, it has nevertheless developed several industries 
from scratch using the widest margin of political discretion that WTO flexibilities allow 
and often ignoring international community admonitions to behave according to inter-
national expectations (He 2015). In particular, China has been rebuked for unfair prac-
tices flowing from the dominance of its state-owned enterprises in international trade 
and investment. In anticipation for an eventual Chinese admittance, several TPP chap-
ters targeted such issues, for instance Chapter 9 on Investment, Chapter 15 on Govern-
ment Procurement, Chapter  16 on Competition, and especially Chapter  17 on 
State-Owned Enterprises. IPR protection (Chapter 18 on Intellectual Property, specifi-
cally on the regulation of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and others) has surfaced 
among the top critical issues relating to China (Dimitrov 2009). Some industries domi-
nated by TNCs have been antagonized by the strategies employed by China for attaining 
its development goals, inter alia, promoting infant industries in crowded markets (such 
10 ICTSD, “Tensions Run High on US Presidential Campaign Trail as TPP Debate Continues,” Bridges Weekly, April 7, 
2016. http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/issue-archive/tensions-run-high-on-us-presidential-campaign-trail-
as-tpp-debate. Accessed April 14, 2016.
11 “A Message from President-Elect Donald J. Trump”, published on Youtube.com November 21, 2016. https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=7xX_KaStFT8&feature=share. Accessed November 22, 2016.
12 See Macarena García Lorca, “Chile: Las críticas al TPP y la respuesta de la sociedad civil a Heraldo Muñoz”, Bilat-
erals.org, February 12, 2016. http://www.bilaterals.org/?chile-las-criticas-al-tpp-y-la&lang=en. Accessed April 14, 2016; 
“Declaraciones del ‘Encuentro Internacional de Organizaciones Sociales en oposición al TPP”, Bilaterals.org, February 3, 
2016. http://www.bilaterals.org/?declaraciones-del-encuentro&lang=en. Accessed April 14, 2016; and Sujata Dey, “The 
TPP Erodes Public Policy to Benefit the World’s Plutocrats”, Huffington Post, January 20, 2016. http://www.huffington-
post.ca/sujata-dey/trans-pacific-partnership-plutocrats_b_9009838.html. Accessed April 14, 2016; and AFL-CIO, et al. 
“TPP Joint Letter to President Obama,” submitted to The White House on December 16, 2014. http://www.aflcio.org/
content/download/146881/3760211/file/TPP-Joint+Letter+Dec+17+2014+FINAL.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2016.
13 Ami Miyazaki and Tom Westbrook “Trump sinks Asia trade pact, opening the way for China to lead” Reuters.com 
November 22, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tpp-idUSKBN13H0OT. Accessed November 22, 
2016.
14 The initiative of launching RCEP negotiations came up during the ASEAN leader’s summit in November 2012.
15 See also: Jianmin Jin, “China’s Concerns Regarding TPP no More than Empty Worries?” Fujitsu Research Institute, 
Current Topics, January 11, 2012. http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/message/2012/2012-01-11.html. Accessed 
13 April 2016.
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as the civil aircraft industry) by partially circumventing WTO rules (He 2015). The TPP 
clearly sought to regulate irritating Chinese trade practices and to forestall their replica-
tion as an RCEP model. It may also be aimed to counter the adoption of alternative 
international cooperation proposals under the BRICS, of which China is an influential 
partner.16 Although the BRICS members’ are not currently engaged in discussing an 
alternative FTA, the new financial agencies created in 2014 may have indirect implica-
tions on interregional trade relations (Contipelli and Picciau 2015).17
In principle, the TPP promises as one of its primary attributes to coexist with other 
regional and sub-regional trade agreements including NAFTA. This means that the TPP 
regime would overlap with other RTA regulations such as rules of origin,18 exacerbating 
the complexity of the institutional maze already in place. It remains to be seen how the 
TPP would actually function in the event it receives final approval by the US Congress 
and the other signatory countries. It seems obvious that it would multiply the number of 
rules and standards, thus rendering transactions more complicated, and would erode 
privileges gained under other agreements. In fact, this is what the Mexican government 
holds as its main motivation for joining the negotiations and signing the TPP. Given the 
difficulty in breathing new life into NAFTA, Mexican business and government officials 
have explicitly maintained that the TPP would serve to consolidate its major export mar-
ket and the North American production network, built since the Agreement came into 
effect in 1994 (de Rosenzweig Mendialdua 2015).19
16 Acronym for an association of the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa.
17 Even though the BRICS is more a pragmatic than an ideological approach to international cooperation, such a group-
ing has taken steps towards a more institutionalized order by creating the New Development Bank (2014) and the Con-
tingency Reserve Agreement (2014) (both components of BRICS’ financial architecture became active in 2015). With 
these initiatives, the BRICS group is increasingly influential not only in Latin American financial matters but also in 
reshaping the wider global order in open challenge to US-led order (Contipelli and Picciau 2015; see also Simon Tisdall. 
“Can the Brics create a new world order?” The Guardian, March 29, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2012/mar/29/brics-new-world-order. Accessed December 15, 2016).
18 In this issue, the NAFTA rules of origin for the automotive sector established 62.5% of regional content, whereas TPP 
establishes 45% (mainly due to pressure from Japan). This means that more Asian auto-parts suppliers could participate 
in regional production through their own assembling networks. This poses a significant challenge for the remaining local 
suppliers who will compete at a disadvantage with corporate groups and their usual suppliers. For the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, regional content was stipulated at 40 and 45% for certain products (see “Contenido regional de 50% en 
el TPP pide industria a SE (Ministry of Economy)”, El Economista, July 29, 2015. http://eleconomista.com.mx/indus-
trias/2015/07/29/contenido-regional-50-tpp-pide-industria-se. Accessed August 18, 2016; see also Government of Mex-
ico “Tratado de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP)”. http://www.gob.mx/tratado-de-asociacion-transpacifico. Accessed 
August 13, 2016.
19 Francisco de Rosenzweig Mendialdua served as Undersecretary for Foreign Trade, in the Ministry of Economy during 
the last stages of the TPP negotiations. See also: Government of Mexico “Tratado de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP)” 
ibid; Ministry of Economy (Mexico) “¿Qué es el #TPP?” December 7, 2015. http://www.gob.mx/se/articulos/que-es-el-
tpp-17223. Accessed August 13, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mexico) “#TPP ampliará la estrategia comercial de 
México” November 18, 2015. http://www.gob.mx/sre/articulos/tpp-ampliara-estrategia-comercial-de-mexico. Accessed 
August 13, 2016; Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE, Mexico) “Reunión de seguimiento del Acuerdo Estratégico 
Transpacífico de Asociación Económica (TPP) entre la Secretaria de Economía y el sector empresarial” October 15, 
2015. http://www.cce.org.mx/reunion-de-seguimiento-del-acuerdo-estrategico-transpacifico-de-asociacion-economica-
tpp-entre-la-secretaria-de-economia-y-el-sector-empresarial/. Accessed August 13, 2016; “TPP abre oportunidades 
para México en Asia: Guajardo” El Economista, October 15, 2015. http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2015/10/05/
ttp-abre-oportunidades-mexico-asia-guajardo. Accessed August 13, 2016; Confederación de Cámaras Industriales 
(CONCAMIN, Mexico) “CONCAMIN analiza procesos de negociación y exhorta al Poder Legislativo a aprobar TPP” 
Comunicado de prensa (Press release) July 27, 2016. http://concamin.mx/?paged=3&post_type=comunicados Accessed 
August 13, 2016. CCE (http://www.cce.org.mx/) and CONCAMIN (http://concamin.mx/) are the largest and most 
influential private sector industrial associations in Mexico. Both associations participated along with several other secto-
rial associations and a few neoliberal “FTA specialists” in the so-called “next room”.
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Perspectives on diversification and upholding the US market
The TPP is a potentially favorable instrument for economic diversification in Mexico. 
However, it is not clear whether Mexico’s involvement is part of a strategic plan to link 
up with the Asian integration process or a reactive response aimed at safeguarding the 
privileges acquired under the now outdated NAFTA. In any case, the fundamental idea 
is that Mexico’s linkage to Asia is through the US.20 Hence, the diversification promise by 
the TPP does not seem plausible.
Although difficult to ascertain, the apparent concentration of the Mexican economy 
probably reflects the triangulation of major business networks where some trade and 
investment activities purportedly linked to US firms are actually nodes of trans-regional 
production networks of Japanese and Korean firms, among others (Falck 2012). The TPP 
might accentuate such dynamics rather than help to develop new markets. Moreover, 
since US trade with several TPP member countries is marginal as well, triangulation is 
doubly irrelevant for Mexico.
Mexico has more free trade agreements than most countries in the world (11 with 46 
countries) and, in theory, they were negotiated in order to diversify our economic relations. 
To be sure, according to Comtrade data, we have lowered the concentration of our exports 
to the US from 88% in 2000 to 81.2% in 2015, while diminishing import concentration from 
70 to 49%. Nevertheless, the reduced concentration of our exports in this period is explained 
by the increased importance of China as a trade destination for Mexican exports—the 
Asian giant has moved from 19th to 3rd place. Besides, imports from China, a country with 
which we do not have a trade agreement, has jumped from 1.5 to 17.7% in 16 years. By con-
trast, since the Mexico-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement came into force in 2005, 
Mexican exports have grown in volume and value, but not its share with respect to overall 
exports (from 0.69 in 2005 to 0.79 in 2015). Something similar occurred with imports, shift-
ing from 5.77 to 4.39% in the same period. It is possible to see such a pattern with the other 
agreements as well; this is partly why Mexican business leaders themselves have recognized 
that despite the large number of trade agreements most of them have been underutilized 
(CEE 2010: 185–6). In reality, therefore, the impact of commercial treaties as a trade diversi-
fication strategy has been comparatively marginal, though in some cases, such as the 
NAFTA, they may have had an impact on investment inflows.21 In view of the foregoing, it 
20 Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy), “Memorias Documentales: TPP”, 2012. http://www.economia.gob.
mx/files/transparencia/informe_APF/memorias/14_md_tpp_sce.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2016.
21 Besides boosting the volume of trade among signatories and the concentration of Mexican exports-imports, the NAFTA 
functioned as a detonator of inward foreign investment owing mainly to the privileged access to the large US market and 
cheaper labor costs provided by Mexico. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed not only from the US but also from Asia 
and Europe. Even before the NAFTA came into effect, large TNCs and their respective clusters of suppliers had already 
established operations on Mexican soil, especially in regions enjoying competitive advantages such as border states and cit-
ies (e.g., Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Tijuana and Mexicali) as well as more industrialized central states (e.g., Aguascalientes, 
Puebla, Mexico City, Queretaro, and the State of Mexico). However, increased foreign investment led to intra-industry and 
intra-firm trade among TNCs and their traditional contractors, which did not always prove beneficial for established Mexi-
can suppliers; in the case of Japan and Korean FDI in Mexico, the NAFTA consolidated these trade dynamics. According to 
Comtrade data (http://comtrade.un.org/), in 2015, Mexico imported US$ 17,368 billion from Japan and US$ 14,619 billion 
from Korea, while exporting only US$ 3017 billion and US$ 2770 billion to these countries, respectively. In both cases, 70 
to 80% of total imports from these Asian countries were comprised of parts and components assembled by Japanese and 
Korean companies located in industrial parks in Mexico and re-exported as final goods, mostly to the US, whereas nearly 
80% of Mexican exports to those countries consisted only of primary and semi-manufactured products. Trade volume and 
composition have painted an unfavorable picture of Mexican industrial producers, who represent less than a 5% share of 
global production networks. Contrary to expectations, Mexico did not attract Japanese FDI to any significant extent in the 
five years following the adoption of the Japan-Mexico FTA in 2005. That is, no significant positive correlation has been dem-
onstrated between FTAs and increased investment (López Aymes and Salas-Porras 2012; Bancomext 2015).
Page 10 of 23López Aymes  Bandung J of Global South  (2017) 4:1 
is unclear what the impact of the TPP on Mexican economic and social development would 
be.
It is true that total trade generally improves after the enactment of a trade agree-
ment, but not always as a result of additional high-value exports from Mexican firms. 
An explanation may lie in the fact that Mexican entrepreneurs have proven to be poorly 
informed about the advantages, risks and obstacles involved in international trade. This, 
combined with an absence of real interest in exploring new business prospects in Asian 
markets, as well as an inability to satisfy demand regarding quality/quantity and an out-
right lack of strategic planning, has meant that the private sector rarely ventures beyond 
the comfort zone of the US market. The field of international trade is thus left wide open 
to non-Mexican entrepreneurs.
Clearly, Mexico-US economies are well integrated and production networks involv-
ing Mexican and non-Mexican companies are firmly established, which has led to an 
extraordinary dependence on the US market. Two examples provide a telling contrast 
to the case of Mexico. Trade between Austria and Germany—two highly integrated 
economies—is much less concentrated, with Austrian exports to Germany representing 
29% of their total exports, and imports from Germany accounting for 37% of their total 
imports. Korea and China is a similar case. While the highly desirable Chinese market is 
the most important destination for Korean exports, it still captures only a quarter of the 
total, mostly consisting of value-added goods and parts for re-export; slightly over 10% 
of Korean exports go to the US. By way of comparison, imports from China are 17% of 
the Korean total, followed by 10% from Japan and 8.7% from the US (Comtrade). As can 
be noted, while it is natural that the US is Mexico’s largest trading partner, bilateral trade 
between these countries represents a highly disproportionate percentage of total Mexi-
can trade.
In political economy, this excessive dependency reflects the regional division of labor 
and the logic of economic concentration. Nevertheless, it leaves Mexico at a disadvan-
tage when it comes to understanding and developing other market networks. Clearly, 
judging from the Mexican experience, incentives in the form of formal trade agreements 
have not succeeded in encouraging local entrepreneurs to take risks or even attempt to 
tackle the Asian TPP markets lauded by the Mexican government as representing a great 
opportunity given the rapid economic growth in that region. It is worth bearing in mind 
that one country’s exports are another’s imports. The focus by the government and vari-
ous business associations on export diversification misses the point that imports are a 
key component of trade, particularly as regards enhancing competitivity and acquisition 
of technology. It is risky to assume that the commercial deficit resulting from intra-
industry trade and tied to transnational networks will eventually be offset by exports to 
the US. This would come at the expense of weakening the technological and production 
capacities of local producers. For imports to become a source of competition encourag-
ing efficiency and serving as a channel for technological diffusion, require certain condi-
tions: adequate industrial as well as S&T policies, a balanced patent system, and a 
strategic vision from the business community. However, industrial policy, access to tech-
nology, and capital formation in Mexico rely heavily on foreign investment. While the 
patent system is strong, it mostly benefits TNCs. As a consequence, the Mexican busi-
ness community seldom explores new markets and business opportunities, nor does it 
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invest in R&D, in part due to the political coalition that resulted from the liberalization 
and internationalization of Mexican economy in the 1980s and 1990s (Shadlen 2012). 
These circumstances make it challenging to fulfill the diversification opportunities 
promised by the TPP.22
Another argument against the TPP as an instrument for diversification is that Mexico 
already enjoys active agreements with most of the other 11 members: Chile, Canada, the 
US, Peru, and Japan. In fact, with Peru and Chile, Mexico also shares membership in the 
Pacific Alliance. Given the small and diverse group of participants, the gains from access 
to new markets have been negligible for Mexico. We do not have trade agreements with 
Australia, Brunei, New Zealand, Vietnam, Singapore or Malaysia, but our economic rela-
tions with these countries are marginal,23 and there are no signs that this will change in 
the near future to warrant participating with them in strategic initiatives, at least not in 
the economic arena.
The current discourse in favor of the TPP tends to highlight the economic importance 
of the partnership and its weight in terms of wealth, international trade and investment. 
However, most economic data are inflated as a result of including the US and Japan 
within the aggregate. If we remove the US from the calculations, the remaining TPP 
members would present quite a different picture, even with Japan still included among 
them. For instance, of the more than $27 trillion gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
TPP members, the US alone accounts for approximately US$17 trillion. Hence, refer-
ring to the TPP as a market of nearly 800 million people is an overstatement, as the US, 
Japan and Mexico account for nearly two-thirds of the total population. Besides, without 
the US, the share of trade relations among the remaining TPP partners is minimal (see 
Table 1), with the other ten partners making up barely 4.83% of total Mexican export 
destinations. If additionally we remove Canada and Japan, with whom we also have 
FTAs, the share would fall to 1.48%. Finally, in order for the TPP to enter into force it 
must be ratified by at least the number of countries that together account for 85% of 
the group’s GDP: that is, Japan and the US. If either of these countries fails to ratify the 
Agreement, it will not take effect.
I also considered the following question: to what extent does the TPP foster diversifi-
cation of FDI sources, in theory, crucial to technological diffusion? FDI is a relevant fac-
tor for constructing global production chains and providing access to new technologies. 
In this regard, establishing strong IPR regimes can serve to attract more FDI and trigger 
a virtuous cycle of investment and growth. However, while this works well among devel-
oped countries, the situation is less clear in circumstances involving asymmetrical trade 
relations (Schneider 2005). In the case of Mexico, the NAFTA negotiations in the early 
1990s not only consolidated a privileged relationship with the most important market at 
that time; it also helped to attract foreign companies from countries other than the US 
and Canada. Those countries were motivated by trade diversion concerns because of the 
regional content provisions in the Agreement, and by fears of being left outside North 
American production networks. However, as a result of the negotiation process, the 
22 In Mexico, most R&D is carried out by public universities and supported with public funding (see OECD Main Sci-
ence and Technology Indicators) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB. Accessed August 19, 2016.
23 In 2014, the Mexican exports to some TPP partners accounted for the following proportions: Australia, 0.2539%; 
Brunei, 0.00065%; Malaysia, 0.0492%; New Zealand, 0.0249%; Singapore, 0.1331%; and Vietnam, 0.0435% (see: UN 
Comtrade Database http://comtrade.un.org/. Accessed April 14, 2016).
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Mexican government was forced to revise its patent system unilaterally and give up 
authority on all matters pertaining to technology (Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-TRIPS) (Aboites and Soria 2008; Shadlen 
2012).24 Until then, the Mexican government had held control over domestic regulations 
on import substitution. The revised patent system offered FDI from different sources an 
additional incentive to select Mexico, thus effectively diversifying the country’s sources 
of industrial capital. Nevertheless, FDI inflow to Mexico—more than 55% came from 
North America25—did not wholly translate into effective knowledge sharing, access, or 
accumulation, and this may have been attributable to the new patent regime as well as to 
weak S&T policy. Even though foreign investment and patent applications increased 
after NAFTA was signed, the proportion of Mexican applicants remained negligible 
compared to that of other foreign applicants (see Graph 1). Even if major trade agree-
ments such as NAFTA do attract foreign investment, this does not mean that technology 
is shared or developed locally by transnational firms, precisely because incentives entail 
the protection of technological expertise rather than rendering it available and usable by 
newcomers in a timely fashion. Therefore, notwithstanding its advantages regarding for-
eign investment diversification, the TPP poses a significant challenge to local firms and 
knowledge producers for catching up, upgrading or innovation, even if talented and 
highly qualified human resources are available.
In light of the above, what do the advocates of the TPP really mean when they claim 
that it will allow “preferential access to 11 of the most important economies in the 
world?”26 Aside from protecting TNC-owned IPRs, it is far from certain that diversifica-
tion of FDI sources would contribute to the technological upgrading of the Mexican 
industrial base. These considerations lead us to question the strategic value of being a 
member of the TPP in the context of export market diversification, and the presumed 
advantage of being an active player in global supply chains for both the US and the Asia 
Pacific region. Therefore, the argument that TPP is desirable as an instrument for trade 
and investment diversification is not convincing.
The TPP as a problem for Mexican domestic technology development and innovation
In both academic and industrial practice, an implicit and explicit debate exists over the 
meaning of fair, trustworthy and transparent economic systems and rules for establish-
ing a “level playing field”. This is a crucial matter for the political economy of develop-
ment, because rules can either hinder or stimulate progress in S&T and innovation. The 
common perspective holds that the only advantageous and sustainable way for a country 
to develop and become part of the capitalist production system is by finding a way to 
consolidate its own capacity for technology development and innovation (Olwan 2013). 
That is why the establishment of rules and policies for nurturing and stimulating local 
research in S&T is vital for autonomous development, and for allowing the productive 
sector to harvest the gains from its own efforts.
24 See Footnote 4.
25 Ministry of Economy: “México registró 21,585.6 mdd de Inversión Extranjera Directa,” November 24, 2015. http://
www.gob.mx/se/articulos/mexico-registro-21-585-6-mdd-de-inversion-extranjera-directa. Accessed August 17, 2016.
26 Government of Mexico, “Tratado de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP)”, ibid.
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Chapter 18 of the TPP concerns IPRs. It covers a significant range of issues related to 
intellectual creation in the artistic, scientific, industrial and marketing areas, as well as 
in more collective endeavors involving traditional knowledge and its applications. It also 
includes specifications on copyrights, trademarks and geographical indications, some of 
which are important to preserve. Among the main features and novelties of the IPR pro-
visions on patents (which confer limited, rights of exclusion to owners of knowledge) 
and trade secrets are (a) the patentability of processes and new uses of known pharma-
ceutical, chemical, agrochemical and biological products including medicines; (b) limits 
on justifications for revoking patents; (c) compensation for restrictions and unreason-
able delays in patent concessions; (d) criminal penalties for trade secret theft, trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy; and (e) clarifications regarding state-owned enter-
prises. The new standard for leveling the IPR playing field establishes 10 years of data 
protection for agrochemical products; 5 years for new pharmaceutical products; 3 years 
for clinical trials (undisclosed) of new indicators, formulas and administrative methods; 
and 5–8 years for pharmaceutical and biological agents. It also follows Article 39.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement in setting no time limits for the protection of trade secrets.
The Objectives section (Art. 18.2) states that “The protection and enforcement of IPRs 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-
logical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.” The Mexican negotiators argue that they made every 
effort to ensure a balance between the interests of producers and those of society, not-
withstanding the intense pressure exerted by TNCs and some sectoral associations such 
as AMIIF.27 The relevant chapters also synthesize a large number of international agree-
ments and norms of which Mexico is already a signatory, although there are some novel-
ties including rules for digital technologies and the acceptance of the International Union 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).
In discussing the potential impact of the TPP on inhibiting or stimulating domestic 
technological development, the debate should refer to economic history, and recognize 
that the governments in what are now regarded as advanced economies have always 
played an active role in such development processes. For example, from the beginning of 
their respective industrialization processes, the Japanese, Korean and Chinese govern-
ments recognized that domestic technological development was the key to climbing the 
industrial ladder, ensuring that their national firms captured the value added generated 
from their own investments and production (Ernst 2015a; He 2015; Jung and Mah 2014; 
27 The AMIIF (Asociación Mexicana de Industrias de Investigación Farmacéutica, A.C.) represents more than 
40 leading pharmaceutical and biotech R&D firms with presence in Mexico and worldwide. See also: “Produc-
tos sensibles, el tema a tocar del TPP: Guajardo” El Economista, July 30, 2015 http://eleconomista.com.mx/indus-
trias/2015/07/30/productos-sensibles-tema-tocar-tpp-guajardo. Accessed August 13, 2016; CCE “Reunión de 
seguimiento del Acuerdo Estratégico…” op cit., and personal communication with one of the IP chapter negotiators 
who requested anonymity. A relative success of the negotiators was to limit the period of protection for undisclosed 
tests or other data (Article 18.50) from the original 12 years requested by the pharmaceutical industry to 5 years, and 
to 8 years for biologics, under Article 18.52.1(a) (Biologics). In order to implement and comply with Chapter 18 pro-
visions, Mexico agreed upon the following transition periods:
1. Article 18.7.2(d) (International Agreements), UPOV 1991, 4 years (currently Mexico is part of the 1978 Convention);
2. Article 18.47 (Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data for Agricultural Chemical Products), 5 years;
3. Article 18.48.2 (Patent Term Adjustment for Unreasonable Curtailment), 4.5 years;
4. Article 18.50 (Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data), 5 years;
5. Article 18.52 (Biologics), 5 years; and
6. Section J (Internet Service Providers), 6 years.
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KPR 2007; Yoon 2014; Lee 2012; Liu and Cheng 2011). Before them, the United States,28 
Germany, France and other European powers had done the same, and continued to 
finance and foster research and development programs thereafter. In this context, the 
demand by the TPP for non-intervention and for eliminating government subsidies 
sounds rather hypocritical (Chang 2002, Ch. 4; Chang and Grabel 2004, Ch. 8; Atkinson 
2015). More recently, several South East Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia 
and Vietnam have followed this path, although with more difficulty as a result of the 
international regulatory system which was either nonexistent or substantially weaker in 
the postwar years. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s, issues such as IPRs, subsidies, 
and restrictions on government financing for infant industries were added to the GATT 
agenda (DiCaprio 2010; DiCaprio and Gallagher 2006).
At various times, some East Asian countries established strategic development regu-
lations to partner FDI with developmental goals. These encouraged technology transfer 
and the direct participation of local personnel in technological development processes 
(Dent 2003; He 2015; Lee 2005). Such a vision was coupled with an economic strategy 
integrating industrial, education and S&T policies in a fairly efficient way, in spite of pres-
sures from global market forces and international regimes (He 2015; Liu and Cheng 2011; 
Park 2012). But most importantly, they did so while pursuing concrete national objec-
tives such as the formation of domestic automotive, pharmaceutical, electronics, and 
aerospace industries, among others (López Aymes 2010). Consequently, in forbidding 
states from playing a leading role in the formation and support of national industries (e.g., 
through the rules of origin in Chapter 3 and public sector procurement in Chapter 15) 
and reserving access to knowledge and new technologies exclusively to its own private 
28 Among others, see the Vannevar Bush report "Science, The Endless Frontier." It is unambiguous in its findings and 
arguments about spending on research and development as a matter of US national security. Report is available at: 



























































































































Graph 1 Patent applications from Mexicans (residents), foreigners and FDI in Mexico (1980–2015). Asterisk 
This was enforced by the 1991 Law for Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property. Source World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD; Aboites and Soria (2008); IMPI (2016: 6)
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companies by imposing a patent system which privileges and prolongs the monopoly by 
foreign enterprises, the TPP would serve to institutionalize a relationship of dependence 
and would formalize a system rife with disparities, inequity, and deficiencies.
In other words, the deficiencies of the IPR rules established in the TPP favoring trans-
national firms mostly from advanced economies, would hamper domestic technology 
development, knowledge accumulation and access to new technologies. As stated by 
Sebastian Herreros from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC):
US business groups have called to use the TPP negotiations to set a new, higher 
standard for protection of IPRs, thus raising the protection levels agreed in previ-
ous US bilateral FTAs (which already exceed in several aspects those agreed in the 
WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement). Intellec-
tual property is an area in constant expansion in a world economy which is increas-
ingly technology—and knowledge—driven. Accordingly, the US—as the world’s 
largest net exporter of intellectual property—has pursued since the 1980s a policy 
of continuous upward protection of IPRs in its trade negotiations, in which the last 
FTA negotiated (in this case the one with Korea) becomes the de facto baseline for 
future talks (Herreros 2011: 31–2).
Among the most salient trade-related rules in the TPP are the ones concerning IPR 
protection in the areas of industrial, pharmaceutical, biological and agricultural technol-
ogies. It is understandable that firms should seek to curb piracy, since allowing a tempo-
rary monopoly on knowledge tends to stimulate investment in research and innovation 
with the expectation of returns from R&D expenditures (Ordover 1991). However, the 
prevailing outlook of the TPP privileges the attribution of exclusive rights to authors 
and producers over safeguarding the rights of the general public and the advancement of 
those lagging behind—many of them trailing as a consequence of the way in which the 
capitalist system has evolved in the postwar era. Moreover, the possibility of patenting 
new applications as well as novel methods and processes for the use of products already 
in the market may have an adverse effect on secondary patents. This so-called “ever-
greening” effect could not only prompt anticompetitive practices, but also discourage 
innovation by permanently obstructing access to new technologies or by charging large 
sums of money for access to their patents, thus making overall production processes 
even more costly and inefficient (Stiglitz 2006, Ch. 4). Additionally, it could encourage 
strategic patenting, which precludes innovation and can be used as a market deterrent 
(Ernst 2015b; Girard 2012). This is anything but conducive to reducing the technological 
gap and improving human wellbeing.
From a wider perspective, it is not yet clear how the TPP could accomplish its objec-
tive of “contribut[ing] to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology” as stated in Art. 18.2. The opposite is more likely, and 
the institutional constraints of the Agreement may end up limiting the possibilities for 
domestic technology development and inhibiting innovation in national industries, as 
TNCs seldom transfer technology voluntarily. Even if Mexico is home to a number of 
leading firms in the electronics, pharmaceutical, automotive, and aeronautics industries, 
among others, the number of patents generated by Mexican companies is minuscule in 
Page 17 of 23López Aymes  Bandung J of Global South  (2017) 4:1 
comparison with those generated by their foreign counterparts (see Graph  1 above). 
Moreover, the main Mexican applicants are made up of public universities and research 
institutes (IMPI 2016: 15) with very weak linkages to the private sector. It should be 
noted that the growing presence of TNCs has not led to the desired stimulation of 
national industry in high-value segments; their main contribution has been the creation 
of jobs in the low and semi-skilled workforce, along with a few top management posi-
tions. It is clear that the low level of public and private investment in R&D is largely 
responsible for the poor performance in patent applications. This may reflect three 
things: first, that the Mexican S&T policy is shallow and generally lacking in financial 
resources;29 second, that the strong IPR regimes introduced in the 1990s have curtailed 
the utilization of new technologies by domestic firms and have obstructed their chances 
of finding incentives and strengthening their capabilities for engaging in R&D, and third, 
as Shadlen (2012: 303) argues, “economic liberalization and internationalization of the 
economy, strengthened a coalition based on a low-technological form of integration into 
the global economy, and the same processes have withered away the coalition that might 
push for an alternative project”. Under these conditions, it has often been necessary for 
Mexican firms to purchase patents, or to wait at least 20  years for them to expire 
(according to TRIPs to which TPP’s Chapter  18 is linked), an excessively long period 
considering the pace of technological innovation.
The new IPR rules in the TPP—labeled by Leonardo Burlamaqui as “TRIPs-plus with 
steroids”—were set to establish even higher standards than those mandated by the 
WTO-TRIPs.30 Notwithstanding, Mexican negotiators argue that they actually soften 
IPR pressure.31 The ongoing knowledge monopoly primarily favors the large corpora-
tions of the advanced economies, with the duration of patents often stretching over arbi-
trary and unreasonably long periods (Stiglitz 2006, Ch. 4). While the IPR chapter in the 
Agreement, particularly the section pertaining to patents, would surely bring greater 
certainty to foreign investors in Mexico, it would most likely prevent the state from 
upgrading domestic technology development and stepping up innovation by national 
industrial and scientific communities.
Results and discussion
The TPP is designed to profoundly transform the interregional trade and investment 
landscape, and would challenge the capacity of many of its members to compete with 
the “big players” using their rules. Mexico has played the game before and is a champion 
29 The current National Development Plan for Mexico 2012–2018 includes the goal of increasing private investment 
in R&D and achieving 1% of Gross Domestic Expenditure for Research and Development (GERD) (as opposed to an 
average of 2.37% for the OECD countries in 2011). To this effect, the main strategy stated by the government consists 
in producing and strengthening human capital available to harness knowledge transfers; see Diario Oficial “Programa 
Especial de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2014–2018”, available at: http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codig
o=5354626&fecha=30/07/2014. Accessed August 19, 2016. Mexican GERD grew from 0.43% at the start of President 
Enrique Peña’s term in 2012 to 0.54% in 2014 (in contrast to an average of 2.38% for the OECD, and 4.29% for Korea). 
In 2014, 73.56% of the Mexican GERD was financed by the government vs. 23.76% by the industry (as opposed to 27.83 
vs. 60.92%, respectively, for the OECD, and 22.96 vs. 75.33%, respectively, for Korea). In 2014, financing for GERD as a 
percentage of GDP was 0.40% by the government vs. 0.13% by the industry (compared to 0.66 vs. 1.45%, respectively for 
the OECD as a whole; and 0.99 vs. 3.23%, respectively, for Korea). Among the OECD countries, Mexico indicates one of 
the lowest ratios of researchers per thousand labor force, with a total of 0.78% in 2011 (no record is available thereafter) 
as opposed to 7.21% for the OECD as a whole. Korea indicated 11.51% in 2011 and 13.02% in 2014 (OECD Main Science 
and Technology Indicators, op cit.).
30 See Footnote 5.
31 Personal communication, September 14, 2015.
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at accumulating trade agreements. However, the Mexican experience has not shown 
that FTAs provide any particular advantage to national exporters, except for businesses 
related to raw materials, natural resources, and low-tech, low-value intermediate goods. 
Some firms supply goods and services within global production networks, but in the sec-
ond and third tiers or below.
Encouragingly, the 2012–2018 National Development Plan of Mexico considers the 
Asia Pacific area to be a key region for development; however, other than jumping on 
the TPP bandwagon, it is unclear that the Mexican government has any concrete plans 
for engaging strategically with Asia as a way of helping to upgrade its economic rela-
tions and foster technological development. Accordingly, joining the TPP, or any other 
similar treaty if the Agreement is ultimately rejected by the US, would be problematic if 
the purpose were to alleviate structural deficiencies in the Mexican economy. Crafting a 
comprehensive economic policy to address industrial and trade concerns, as well as to 
promote science, education and domestic technological innovation, would be a highly 
effective way of positioning Mexico to compete internationally and take advantage of the 
Asian integration process. This is the strategy that East Asian economies have followed 
so successfully, and continue to pursue today.
This leads us to the second major issue discussed in this paper: the prospect of enhanc-
ing technological capacity and innovation within a strict IPR regime. Industrial policy 
plays a key role here, but in Mexico and elsewhere this is often tied to systems of patron-
age and focused almost exclusively on clientelism. A well-conceived strategic industrial 
policy should set explicit goals for development and avoid becoming ensnared in “money 
politics”. Industrial policy can be functional yet focused on particular activities such as 
investing in S&T as well as supporting R&D and innovation in targeted industrial sec-
tors. This opens up possibilities for exploiting as yet uncrowded niches including clean-
energy and energy-efficient environmentally sustainable transportation, and so on. For 
this to happen, however, a different structure governing knowledge and technology in 
the public interest is essential (Burlamaqui 2014).
As it is, a level playing field under the prevailing conditions of asymmetrical industrial-
ization will always work against the interests of less developed players (Kim et al. 2012). 
While even a well-designed and comprehensive economic policy might not succeed 
in restraining already established TNCs, it should at least aim to reduce technological 
dependency. Furthermore, before joining the TPP it would be indispensable for Mexico 
to initiate international cooperation schemes that truly advance scientific development 
and the capacity for innovation—in marked contrast to the sort of conditional coopera-
tion currently prevailing, often involving contracting with foreign services or suppliers 
for infrastructure or industrial projects. In short, absent an effective, comprehensive 
and visionary strategy for abetting S&T, infant industry development, education, anti-
monopoly laws, foreign investment, fair trade competition and public sector procure-
ment, joining agreements such as the TPP will only serve to institutionalize dependency.
Accordingly, the debate in the political arena among legislators, executive officers, 
stakeholders and civil society must question the wisdom of joining an agreement that 
would further constrain the ability of Mexico to compete in the high technology sec-
tor—if, indeed, such an effort is being seriously considered at all. In any case, should the 
TPP be approved in the US and, consequently, in Mexico, it is industries that are largely 
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dominated by TNCs who would benefit the most, including the automotive, pharma-
ceutical, electrical and electronics sectors, and, most likely, agro-business (especially as 
regards seeds and biotech). This would further entrench foreign influence on Mexican 
economic policy. I dispute the wisdom of both ratifying the TPP and embracing the idea 
that “being out of it would mean to be left out of the chance to integrate and access 
market opportunities that weren’t available before”. What those new market opportuni-
ties might be is far from clear. On the contrary, IPR rules would likely confine Mexico’s 
“opportunities” to the usual low-value exports, with high-value exports generally being 
handled by foreign firms and their networks. Moreover, these foreign entities push to 
maintain the current knowledge monopolies and pursue strategic patenting. Finally, the 
TPP has been explicitly advocated by the Mexican government to safeguard the posi-
tion of Mexico in the US market. Yet it already enjoys a secure trade relationship with 
the US, without the need to further entrench our peripheral role in the regional division 
of labor. Mexico is also signatory to major IPR conventions, so why make any further 
concessions?
Under present conditions, joining the TPP would most likely place Mexico in much 
the same position it currently holds within the WTO, that is, needing to take advantage 
of every opening provided under current rules governing knowledge in order to support 
infant industry as well as promote R&D and innovation. As put by Amsden and Hikino 
regarding the WTO:
All in all, the liberal bark of the WTO appears to be worse than its bite. The neode-
velopmental state can continue to subsidize new industries where necessary and 
to ensure that subsidies are result-oriented through the imposition of performance 
standards. Instead, the most coercive part of the new international economic order 
is informal. Coercion takes the form of political pressure by the North Atlantic on 
emerging economies to open their markets… (Amsden and Hikino 2000: 110).
If Amsden and Hikino’s argument that “latecomers lack a vision to guide them in 
responding to this pressure” holds true, then we can perhaps find comfort in paraphras-
ing Alexander Wendt to the effect that policy space is what governments and societies 
make of it: it is a perception, a political construction informed by ideas, discourse and 
sometimes self-awareness, or a self-imposed position in the system. What is very real, 
though, are the newly established rules that dictate what countries can or cannot do. 
As asserted by Carolyn Deere (2009), a development-oriented IPR policy must be con-
sistent, coordinate relevant government agencies in collaborative work, develop high-
level legal expertise, engage civil society, and frame issues in a way that is accessible and 
appealing to the media and to the general public. As one of its central functions, such a 
policy must balance broad access to and utilization of knowledge with fair and reason-
able protection for certain intellectual products. Finally, such a policy must defend the 
public interest against monopolies, particularly with regard to pharmaceutical and bio-
tech products.
This research had its limitations, however, most importantly, the fact that, at the time 
of writing, the TPP was still under revision by stakeholders and civil society in signa-
tory countries, and great skepticism overshadows its fate after Donald Trump’s victory 
in presidential elections. As a result, the conclusions on implications for national policy 
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may appear to be speculative. Nevertheless, my critique is grounded in historical evi-
dence regarding the two main issues addressed in this paper: the prospects for diversi-
fication and the alleged benefits of the IPR rules proposed by the TPP. My research in 
both areas indicates that the Agreement would be adverse to national goals including 
economic growth and improved labor conditions. Another limitation to this work was 
lack of access to a wide range of policy-makers and negotiators, most of them still in 
office. Direct contact with individuals involved in negotiating the Agreement would have 
permitted a more qualitative research design. The possibility of conversing with insiders 
in an environment sheltered from political pressure and non-disclosure commitments 
would have deepened our understanding of the nuances of the TPP. A more open dis-
position will probably ensue once the TPP is either ratified or rejected, particularly if 
relevant negotiators remain in office. Furthermore, evaluating diversification lies beyond 
the scope of this paper. It is a long-term, complex and multifaceted process, well beyond 
any formal agreement, which requires follow-up longitudinal research to assess the 
impact of the TPP on deconcentrating economic relations. Nonetheless, the assertion 
by Mexican authorities that the TPP would serve to strengthen North American produc-
tion networks suggests that diversification is seen as a potential secondary effect, not 
as a goal in itself. Consequently, no additional policy initiatives to foster diversification 
can be expected from the Mexican government, with authorities apparently focused on 
attracting foreign investment and increasing imports over the medium term, rather than 
on creating market opportunities for Mexican exports and investment abroad.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the origins and nature of the TPP, and expresses a twofold cri-
tique: first, that the Agreement would hardly contribute to economic diversification and, 
second, that rules governing IPRs would reduce the potential for implementing policies 
in favor of domestic technological development, and would instead privilege the long-
term monopoly interests of TNCs. Given the apparent exhaustion of NAFTA—which 
has neither reduced poverty levels nor strengthened capacity building in Mexico—the 
government and various members of the private sector community in Mexico view the 
TPP as a way of preserving their share of the US market. However, given the character-
istics of our current trade structure, the argument that the TPP can be an instrument for 
diversification and for enhancing access to the Asian market seems neither realistic nor 
plausible—aside from participating in the triangulation of East Asian business networks 
throughout the Mexican and US markets. In addition, not only would the TPP have a 
marginal impact on diversification (or perhaps even economic growth [see Capaldo et al. 
(2016)], it would also tie Mexico’s political economy even more firmly to Washington’s 
geopolitical strategy—including its current efforts to “contain” China—with rules that 
undermine Mexican foreign policy autonomy and its prospects for developing domestic 
technological capabilities. As Bernard Girard (2012) remarks, “Regulations change from 
one country to the other, and what is good for America is not necessarily good for oth-
ers. European and Asian governments could look at other ways to stimulate innovation”. 
Other studies like that of Kim et al. (2012) and Shadlen (2012) support this point, con-
cluding that patent protection enhances innovation and economic growth in countries 
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where the capacity to conduct innovative research already exists, but does not benefit 
countries without such capacity.
To be sure, some chapters of the TPP might result in positive outcomes, namely 
enhanced environmental and wildlife conservation,32 greater transparency and a curbing 
of corruption, trademark, geographical indicators and copyrights protection, reduced 
abuse by state-owned enterprises. Other chapters, such as 21 and 23 on Development, 
fail to spell out specific measures, and reflect mere wishful thinking based on neoliberal 
values. Chapter  23, for example, which devotes a section to technology, constitutes a 
vague defense of the market economy, and does not recognize that encouraging greater 
public and governmental involvement in S&T is inconsistent with maintaining the cur-
rent monopoly of knowledge. This highlights a striking paradox regarding IPRs: the TPP 
claims to develop technological capabilities by cultivating highly skilled human resources 
(scientific and managerial), but imposes strict and lengthy monopolist rights to knowl-
edge. Being required to purchase patents or wait for their expiration or restrict access to 
valuable data for clinical research is not compatible either with the aspiration to enjoy 
fair and open competition or with efforts to develop the capacity for participating at a 
higher level of global production. Instead, TPP rules on IPRs leave very limited institu-
tional space for local companies and research institutions to achieve significant innova-
tions, cultivate human resources in S&T, and enforce IPR rules with some degree of 
discretion. As in the case of NAFTA, opportunities to catch up would be limited, and the 
development of technology and human resources in Mexico would continue to lag. In 
the past, countries like South Korea, and even Germany and Japan in the 19th Century, 
were able to thrive under a more flexible IPR system. China is thriving precisely because 
it chose an alternative path to the dominant global IPR system and pursued a S&T policy 
with the specific aim of catching up with the advanced economies, notwithstanding 
resistance from some international players. Nevertheless, it does not seem that the cost-
benefit relationship would be favorable for Mexico, at least as regards the issues elabo-
rated here—issues which are crucial for the prospects of long-term development.
Finally, the prospect of TPP is bleak and it is very likely it will not be ratified by US. 
Despite such probable fate, it can be expected that the stakeholders who push the TPP 
agenda (i.e., TNCs) will resume their activism in due time, perhaps with a “new” pro-
posal, but surely resembling the controversial Agreement. In that case, I think the criti-
cal view on IPR articulated here may still be valid.
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